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Border walls have recently proliferated and become a global phenomenon with 
about a third of the countries having at least one wall or fence along its 
borders.  This trend contrasts the idea of the global village and fits into a trend 
towards deglobalization. So far little attention has been given to their 
unintended effect. This article fills this gap by developing a gravity model for 
the years 1990-2014 regarding 118 countries, 44 (37%) of which had a wall 
during the research period. The impact of border structures on cross-border 
trade is economically and statistically significant. Countries separated by a wall 
trade on average 46 to 73 percent less than would ceteris paribus be the case if 
the border wall did not exist.  
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The Border Walls of (De)Globalization 
1 Introduction 
Border walls and fortification date back to Ancient and Medieval times and 
were for example used by the Roman and Chinese empires (Vernon and 
Zimmermann 2019, Zenderowski and Jankowski 2018), but the consensus for 
decades has been that border barriers would be something of the past. New 
technologies of transport and warfare obsoleted physical structures that were 
once used to protect the integrity of borders.1 In 1940 the major defence works 
of France (the Maginot Line) and the Netherlands (the Dutch Water Line) 
were designed for the ‘previous’ war and somewhat later in the Second World 
War the Atlantic Wall did not protect Nazi Germany either. In 1989 the 
physical remnants of the Cold War, the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall were 
demolished. The 1990s were an epoch of optimism. The end of the 
superpower conflict, adherence to the principles of the Washington Consensus 
and new digital communication led to the idea of the “global village” in which 
information, people and capital would flow freely (van Bergeijk 1994; Simmons 
and Kenwick 2019). The creation of European Market, agreement on the 
North America Free Trade Area and African regional integration appeared to 
confirm the trend that national borders were becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
Globalization speeded up as never before. Border walls seemed to be 
redundant if not irrelevant in this new world.  
This, however, changed radically around the turn of the Millennium, as 
illustrated in Figure 1. Three decades after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the 
Berlin Wall, nearly one third of the countries have erected some type of walls 
or fences on their borders or as parts of their borders (Szabó 2018:87).2 
Estimates shows that since 1990’s countries which are members of the 
European Union and Schengen area have built almost 1000 km of walls into 
their borders to combat migration. Countries erected walls include Hungary, 
Spain, Greece, Latvia, Bulgaria, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Austria, 
Norway, Estonia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Macedonia (Benedicto and Brunet 
2018:6). In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia constructed 885 km security wall 
with Iraq and fences with the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Jordan and 
Yemen. Israel erected walls and fences which separate it from the West Bank 
and Egypt. United Arab Emirates built walls on its borders with Oman and 
Saudi Arabia. Jordan constructed walls with Iraq and Syria. Iran built a wall 
separating it from Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Kuwait built a wall with 
Iraq. In Asia security walls were built, these include India – Bangladesh, 
 
1 As is usual in this literature our concept of walls also includes other forms of 
physical border barriers such as (electrified) fences. 
2 The modern border barriers are being described depending on their specific roles 
and contexts. They are identified as security, military, anti-terror and defensive wall. 
Some are called fence or barrier. Opponents of these walls use their own description 
depending on how they regard these walls. Terminology like shame, separation, 
apartheid and political walls is mainly applied in criticizing these walls (Saddiki 2017:3). 
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Uzbekistan – Kyrgyzstan, North Korea – South Korea, Turkmenistan – 
Uzbekistan, Myanmar – Bangladesh, Uzbekistan – Afghanistan, Lithuania – 
Belarus, Brunei – Malaysia, Kazakhstan – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan – 
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan – Armenia. In Africa there are fences between 
Botswana and Zimbabwe, Tunisia and Libya, Algeria and Morocco and South 
Africa with Zimbabwe and Mozambique built. In North America the wall 
between US and Mexico is incomplete and plans exist to extend the fences. 
Latin America is free from border walls with exception of one built by the US 
between Guantanamo and Cuba (Vernon and Zimmermann 2019:8-10).  
FIGURE  1 
Border walls and fences 1970-2019 
 
Sources: Based on Vernon and Zimmermann (2019), pp 24-5 and updated based on 
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/russia-builds-border-fence-crimea-ukraine-proper-
181228145700919.html and https://112.international/politics/latvia-builds-93-km-section-of- 
fence-with-barbed-wire-on-border-with-russia-37721.html (date of access: November 26, 2019) 
 Initially, modern walls were built as a response to terrorist threats in 
the wake of the al-Quaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in New York 
(Avdan 2018:118), but later – and especially after the outbreak of the Great 
Recession border wall construction also fitted in a more general pattern of 
deglobalization, populism and related anti-immigration policies (van Bergeijk 
2019). Many walls constructed after 1990 have been built on boundaries which 
have not been disputed. These walls are being described as “Walls of 
Globalization” (Zenderowski and Jankowski 2018:110, Vallet and David 
2012:114) and were erected by both autocracies and democracies and by 
failing, failed states and healthy states alike. Indeed, Figure 1 illustrates that half 
of the currently existing walls has been built since 2008, the year of the Great 
Recession that coincides with the start of the current phase of deglobalization. 
Some of these walls feature regularly in the eight o’clock news such as those 
between Israel and the State of Palestine or between the United States and 
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Mexico. Some are less well known, such as the Melila wall between Spain and 
Morocco and the electrified fence between Botswana and Zimbabwe. A good 
ten walls are, moreover, currently in the advanced planning stage. Indeed, the 
return of the border wall phenomenon is unexpected, both as a real world 
problem, a policy issue and as a scientific challenge (Vallet and David 2012:113 
and Minca and Rijke 2017:2). 
 Modern border walls have become a topic for research and the literature is 
expanding fast and while the construction costs of walls have been 
investigated3 and the economic impact has been assessed in individual cases (as 
will become clear in the review of literature in Section 2), empirical evidence 
on the impact of the wall phenomenon on trade flows is scant. Borders 
(technically: formal differences between jurisdictions) by themselves already 
have a strong impact on trade between those jurisdictions, as is recognized 
especially since the seminal paper by McCallum (1995).  It is well-established 
that border effects are related to trade costs: transport, trade policies, including 
tariffs, exchange rates and Non Tariff Barriers (NTBs), cultural and 
institutional differences and political risks. And we know that all these factors 
reduce cross-border trade significantly.  So why would physical border 
structures need to be studied as a separate topic? Why not treat walls just as 
any other NTB? 
 There are three reasons for studying walls on their own merits. The first 
reason is that commercial and trade policies are driven by trade interests and 
this creates a causality problem that is absent in the case of physical border 
constructions that are predominantly driven by concerns related to migration 
and national security. Second, cultural and institutional differences do not 
show a lot of variation over time (an example is language, historical 
relationships, religion) unlike walls and fences that due to the dynamics of the 
last decades have clear before and after episodes. Third, tariff and non-tariff 
barriers by necessity are not observed directly; tariff rates can be observed 
from official documents, but their application (de facto) may be different from 
the documents (de jure); walls and fences can be observed directly. Together 
with the increased use of walls these three reasons motivate why we study 
border walls and fences as a separate topic.  
 
3 Walls are costly to build, for example the walls constructed by US, Israel and India 
are the largest and most costly infrastructural projects implemented in each nation in 




2 Review of  literature 
The trade impact of border walls and fences predominantly has been analysed 
with the so-called gravity model of international trade. The gravity models that 
have been applied to border walls span three decades and the literature covers 
both the original straight forward macroeconomic formulation (first generation 
models) developed by Tinbergen (1962) and Linnemann (1966), as well as the 
second generation models that have a microeconomic foundation and allow 
for multilateral resistance developed by  Bergstrand (1985, 1989) Baier and 
Bergstrand (2009; 2010) and Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003). While the 
gravity model has a long tradition of application in international relations and 
has been used to investigate a great many visible and invisible barriers to trade 
the topic of border walls was not considered in the 1960s – 1980s.4 Early 
gravity studies on the impact of conflict and cooperation on trade used events 
data that did not code border walls, probably due to both the low frequency 
and semi-permanent nature  of the event of border wall construction as well as 
the coincidence of walls and obvious military and political skirmishes (see van 
Bergeijk and Moons, 2019, for a discussion of this literature). It took until the 
fall of the probably most important modern walls before trade economists 
started to realize the potential importance of border walls and fences. 
First generation models 
 The first wave of econometric analyses was inspired by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the Iron Curtain that offered a new field of application for gravity 
modelling (Breuss and Egger 1999). From the start of this literature (van 
Bergeijk and Oldersma 1990) it has consistently been found that the removal 
of the physical border barriers of the Cold War yielded an economically and 
statistically significant increase in both East West and West East trade flows 
(Table 1 summarizes the key findings of these gravity models). The majority of 
studies (with exception of Van Bergeijk – Oldersma (1990) did not use a 
dummy variable in order to directly estimate the direct impact of the border 
wall and fences of the cold war but derived its impact indirectly by contrasting 
actual and predicted trade flows. The actual development of East West and 
West East trade that showed double digit growth rates for a number of years 
confirms that the predictions by the first generation gravity models were spot 
on.  
The studies of the 1990s with hindsight suffered from a number of 
methodological weaknesses. For one thing the studies of the 1990s did not 
include multilateral resistance terms. A replication, however, by van Bergeijk 
(2015) of the first generation model by Van Bergeijk and Oldersma (1990) used 
a set of Bergstrand-Baier models that include multilateral resistance and fixed 
 
4 See for examples Pollins (1989), van Bergeijk (1992). 
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effects and has found comparable results in terms of the sign and significance 
of the border wall dummy (the size effect is a bit smaller (see Table 1).5 
TABLE 1 
Table 1 Estimated impact of walls in gravity models    
 Countries Period Trade reduction 
Van Bergeijk and Oldersma (1990) 49 1985 – 47% to –89% 
Havrylyshyn and Pritchett (1991) 14 1980-87 – 53% to –69% 
Hamilton and Winters (1992) 76 1984-86 –79% 
Wang and Winters (1992) 76 1984-86 –77% 
Erzan, Holmes and Safadi (1992) 76 1988-90 – 74% to –77% 
Nitsch and Wolf (2013) 101* 1995-2004 – 58% to –71% 
Van Bergeijk (2015) 48 1988 – 73% to –88% 
Carter and Poast (2019) 241 1900-2013 – 11% to –54% 
 241 1948-2013 –37% 
Note: * intra Germany trade between Verkehrsbezirke 
For another thing all first generation models used cross section data (this was 
often a choice by necessity since comparable estimates for GDP were much 
more difficult to obtain also because official statics in the communist world 
reported Net Material Product rather than GDP. As pointed out by Egger 
(2000) cross section analysis in gravity models could lead to unreliable 
estimates since they do not take into account importer and exporter effects. 
On the plus side is that the model predictions indicated very significant 
increases in bilateral trade between East and West which were vindicated by 
the ‘natural experiment’ of the break-down of the Berlin Wall and the Iron 
Curtain. Indeed, both East West and West East trade flows showed double 
digit real annual growth rates for in the early 1990s. 
Second generation models 
The second wave in the wall literature emerged almost a quarter of a century 
later. By and large the approach is again to use a gravity model.6 Nitsch and 
Wolf (2013) use gravity a la Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) to investigate if 
the demolished Berlin Wall and Iron Curtain – although dismantled – still have 
an impact for the trade between 101 so-called Verkehrsbezirke using panel data 
for the period 1995 to 2004 and find a negative effect of the “border” between 
the former DDR (East-Germany) and FRG (West-Germany). Their study is 
not only important because of the empirically established longevity of the 
border effects (of demolished walls), but also because of the fact that this is an 
analysis at a lower level of aggregation. Lower levels of aggregation help to 
 
5 The replication is related to a different year (1985 viz. 1988). 
6 An example is Oberholzer (2015) on the study on impact of the West Bank Wall on 
the Palestinian labour market, using separate linear regression models as well as a 
panel for 2000-2012 with the wall as the only trade-related explanatory variable. 
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avoid causality issues, to control for different transportation modes and 
product types and help to avoid aggregation bias. In contrast Allen et al. (2018) 
study the border constructions between the United States and Mexico with a 
panel gravity model for the years 2006 to 2016 finding no evidence that a 
border fence impacted flow of trade between United States and Mexico.  
An important issue is that border walls and fences are more likely to be 
constructed between countries that have bad political relations (Carter and 
Poast 2017). Indeed, a border wall may also be seen as a symbol of insult and 
provocation to a neighboring country, since decision to build walls are made by 
one part and this can lead to distraction of significant commercial relationship 
(Avdan 2018:125). Consequently. Carter and Poast (2019) also include 
territorial disputes and defense alliances in their gravity panel model for the 
years 1900 to 2010 in addition to the variables that are commonly used in 
gravity model analyses. Their sample is comparatively large and includes many 
small island economies that by definition do not have a border wall and 
moreover by necessity depend on foreign markets for the larger part of goods. 
Relatedly, one particular difficulty with this entire literature has been that 
authors so far have not sufficiently recognized that border walls and fences 
always occur on so-called common borders. It is a general finding of the 
gravity literature that a common border between exporter and importer in 
general is associated with larger trade. Specifications that do not include a 
(dummy) variable for common border will not be able to discriminate between 
the positive impact of the common border in general and the trade reducing 
impact of border walls. For the studies of the 1990s this was less problematic 
since border walls were not as endemic as in today’s world where the issue 
occurs for about a third of the countries. In our analysis we will therefore 
always include a dummy variable that assumes the value 1 if a common border 
exists (and is zero if not). 
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3 Method and data 
As is customary in the literature, we use a standard gravity model that assumes 
that trade will be larger if economic masses (proxied by GDP and population 
of the trading partners) are larger and economic distance is smaller (nearby 
countries trade ceteris paribus more). We complement this model by including 
other trade resisting (landlockedness) or trade facilitating (common language, 
former colonial ties, common borders) factors. This gives us a traditional trade 
model that does not yet include political factors. 
 
lnEijt = α + β1lnGDPit + β2lnGDPjt + β3lnPOPit+ β4lnPOPjt + β5lnDistij+ 
β5Comlangij+ β6Comborderij + β7Evercolij + β8Landlocked it+ 
β8Landlockedit + ijt                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
where  
Eijt = exports of country i to country j in year t 
GDPit= GDP of country i in year t 
GDPjt=GDP of country j in year t 
Distij= distance between capitals of country i and j 
POPit = population of country i in year t 
POPjt= population of country j in year t 
Comlangij is 1 if country i and country j speak the same language, 0 if 
otherwise; 
Comborderij is 1 if country i and country j share the same border, 0 if 
otherwise; 
Evercolij is 1 if country i and country j have colonial links, 0 if otherwise 
Landlockedit is 1 if exporter is landlocked, 0 if otherwise 
Landlockedjt = 1 if importer is landlocked, 0 if otherwise 
ijt = error term. 
 
To this base model we always add Wallit that is a dummy variable with a value 
of 1 for a border wall or fence, else 0 otherwise, and Democratic dyadijt a dummy 
that is 1 if both country i and country j are democratic in year t, 0 if otherwise. 
   We also add in some specifications the dummy variable Hostilityijt that 
assumes the value 1 if the political interaction between i and j is negative, else 
zero. In the latter case the research period due to lacking data reduces to 1990 
– 2010. So we have: 
 
 
lnEijt = α + β1lnGDPit + β2lnGDPjt + β3lnPOPit+ β4lnPOPjt + β5lnDistij+ 
β6Comlangij+ β7Comborderij + β8Evercolij + β9Hostilityijt + 
β10Landlockedit+ β11 Landlockedit +  β12Wallijt  β13Democractic dyadijt + 




Equation (2) is the equation for the panel for the years 1990 – 2014 to be 
estimated in Section 4. 
TABLE 2 
 Summary of independent variables 
Variable Definition Expected 
sign 
Source 
Distij Geographical distance between 
the exporter and importer  
Negative CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
GDPit GDP of exporter country in year t Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
GDPjt GDP of importer country in year t Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
Popit Population of exporter country in 
year t 
Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
Popjt Population of importer country in 
year t 
Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
Wall Dummy variable to describe 
whether the trading partners are 
separated by border wall 
Negative Vernon and 
Zimmermann 2019, 
Carter and Poast 2017 
and Zenderowski and 
Jankowski 2018 
Comlang Dummy variable to describe if 
trading partners share the same 
language. 
Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
 
Comborder Dummy variable to depict if the 
trading countries share the same 
border 
Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
 
Evercolo Dummy variable for a (former 
colonial relationship) 
Positive CEPII, Accessed on 
11th June 2019 
Hostility Dummy variable if two countries 
are in political hostility (dispute) 
Negative Correlates of War 
project, accessed on 
3rd October 2019 
Democratic 
dyad 
Dummy variable if the two 
countries are both democratic 
Positive Centre for Systemic 
Peace, accessed on 
22nd October 2019 
Table 2 summaries the variables and their a priori expected signs. Data for 
exports, GDP, population, distance, colonial ties, common language and con-
tingency was obtained from CEPII database on Trading history by Fouquin 
and Hugot (2016). The data were accessed on 11th June 2019.7 The data for the 
walls was extracted from Vernon and Zimmermann (2019), Carter and Poast 
(2017) and Zenderowski and Jankowski (2018). Data on Millitarized Interstate 
Disputes (political hostility) were obtained from the Correlates of War project 
 
7 CEPII extracted data for exports, GDP and population from the Direction of Trade 
Statistics of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank development 
indicators. Distance is measured as the crow flies between the two main cities in each 
pair of trading countries. 
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updated by Palmer et al. (2019) which covers the period 1816 to 2010. The 
data was accessed on 3rd October 2019. Militarized Interstate Disputes records 
information on conflicts in which a country threatens, displays or uses force 
against another country. (Davis and Meunier 2011; Morrow et al. (1998). Data 
on democratic dyad were extracted from Polity IV project dataset version 
p4v2018 for country reports issued by Centre for Systemic Peace developed by 
Marshall et al. (2017). These data were accessed on 22nd October 2019. The 
data are collected for a period from 1990 to 2014. This is the period after the 
fall of Berlin wall. The panel dataset covers 118 Countries for the period 1990 
to 2010. Among these countries 40 are separated by a border wall or fence.  
    Our dataset is an unbalanced panel with 280,845 observations. Zero trade 
flows in the dataset occur in 59,483 cases which is almost 21% of the dataset. 
We deal with the zero flow issue by means of a linear transformation that 
increases all export flows by 0.05. Table 3 provides the summary statistics for 
the dependent and explanatory variables. 
TABLE 3 
Summary statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Exports 305,221 3.13e+08 3.26e+09 0 2.84e+11 
GDP_origin 323,460 2.12e+11 8.05e+11 8.54e+07 1.07e+13 
GDP_destination 323,632 2.12e+11 8.05e+11 8.54e+07 1.07e+13 
POP_origin 335,239 50239 157566 257 1364270 
POP_destination 335,395 50535 157880 70 1364270 
Distance 335,584 6558 3.895 8 19812 
Comlang 335,584 0.125 0.331 0 1 
Com_border 335,584 0.029 0.167 0 1 
Evercol 335,584 0.016 0.127 0 1 
Land_lock_origin 335,586 0.206 0.405 0 1 
Land_lock_destination 335,586 0.203 0.402 0 1 
Wall 335,586 0.003 0.054 0 1 
Hostility* 280,845 0.005 0.071 0 1 
Democratic Dyad 335,586 0.048 0.214 0 1 




4 Empirical findings 
The correlation matrix does not indicate problems related to multicollinearity 
and the Hausmann test yields a χ2 of 2744 rejecting the null hypothesis that 
random effects is more efficient than fixed effects estimation. Still we also 
present random effects estimates as a robustness check in Table 4 that shows 
the results of our gravity model. 
    Columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 relate to the shorter period 1990-2010 since 
we want to include Hostility for which we do not have data for 2011-2014. It 
appears that Hostility is not significant at all and therefore we are confident 
about our estimates for the full period that do not include Hostility.  
TABLE 4  
Impact of border walls in gravity model (panel 1990-2014) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 









lnGDP_o 0.75*** 1.38*** 0.69*** 1.14*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
lnGDP_d 1.10*** 1.22*** 1.04*** 1.04*** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
lnPOP_o 1.67*** 0.56*** 1.07*** 0.63*** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
lnPOP_d 2.14*** 0.45*** 1.71*** 0.56*** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) 
lnDistance  -2.44***  -2.43*** 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Comlang  1.04***  0.93*** 
  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Com_border  0.72***  0.67*** 
  (0.26)  (0.25) 
Evercol  1.88***  2.27*** 
  (0.31)  (0.31) 
Land_lock_0  -1.39***  -1.88*** 
  (0.10)  (0.10) 
Land_lock_d  -1.09***  -1.34*** 
  (0.10)  (0.102) 
Wall -0.66** -1.30*** -0.62** -1.13*** 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.25) (0.24) 
Hostility 0.15 -0.03   
 (0.14) (0.14)   
Democratic_dyad 0.95*** 0.90*** 0.93*** 1.15*** 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) 
Constant -69.40*** -39.5*** -56.7*** -31.5*** 
 (0.71) (0.60) (0.56) (0.56) 
     
Observations 237,146 237,146 285,039 285,039 
No. of country pairs 12,948 12,948 12,995 12,995 
R2 0.10  0.11  
(Standard errors in parentheses) 




All coefficients confirm to a priori expectations and are highly significant at 
p<0.05 and better. Column (3) reports our preferred equation with Fixed 
Effects, but since this means that we cannot test for time invariant explanatory 
variables we also report in column (4) the Random Effects estimates.  
For the variable of interest (Wall) the difference between the two estimation 
methods is statistically and economically significant. In the Fixed Effect 
estimation the wall reduces exports by 51%; for the Random Effects model 
this is 73%. (Figure 2). and these findings are well in line with the literature 
(compare Table 1). 
Figure 2 




5 Discussion and conclusions 
The recent increase in the interest in the use and impact of border walls may as 
much have been stimulated by the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, as by the construction of the wall along the southern border of the 
United States that has drawn a lot of attention internationally. The revival of 
the use of border walls has been associated with a general tendency to less 
openness and a phase of deglobalization (Myambo and Frassinelli, 2019). 
Rather than the “Walls of Globalization” (Zenderowski and Jankowski 
2018:110, Vallet and David 2012:114) the wave of walls in the 2010s seems to 
be a physical symptom of world-wide deglobalization. 
    Our analysis that deals with the first 15 years of the Millennium 
uncovers significant reduction in bilateral trade due to border walls and fences. 
This finding in itself should not come as a surprise because walls and border 
fences are physical distortions of trade flows. Our finding thus fits into the 
international trade literature on barriers to trade as well as in the international 
relations literature that deal with these specific constructions. The trade costs 
of border walls and fences – that come in addition to the costs of construction 
and maintenance of these physical barriers – are thus significant, but often 
ignored in analyses on the costs of border walls. 
We have not considered other welfare costs of walls, such as travelling 
costs, distortion of factor and product markets or environmental costs. Still 
our finding of a fifty percent reduction of bilateral trade between the two sides 
of the border provides a ball park number that can be applied in cost benefit 
analyses of considered border walls and fences in order to arrive at more 
relevant cost estimates. 
    Issues for further research include use of alternative econometric methods 
that could yield better estimates of the welfare loss due to walls. We also plan 
to further extend our analysis increasing the research period so as to include 
more recent walls, both because this increases the number of walls and because 
this will possibly allow for a test on differences in impact between the pre-2010 
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Appendix 1: Walls included in the dataset for analysis 
1.  Cuba US (Guantanamo) 1961 
2.  Israel  Syria 1973 
3.  Israel  Lebanon 1976 
4.  North Korea  South Korea 1977 
5.  Thailand  Malaysia 1978 
6.  South Africa  Zimbabwe 1984 
7.  India  Pakistan 1988 
8.  Thailand  Cambodia 1987 
9.  Israel  Jordan 1981 
10.  United States  Mexico 1993 
11.  India  Bangladesh 1994 
12.  Kuwait  Iraq 1994 
13.  Uzbekistan  Afghanistan 1994 
14.  Spain  Morocco-Ceuta 1995 
15.  Spain  Morocco-Melilla 1998 
16.  Uzbekistan  Kyrgyzstan 1999 
17.  Turkmenistan  Uzbekistan 2001 
18.  Botswana  Zimbabwe 2003 
19.  Iran  Afghanistan 2003 
20.  Saudi Arabia  Yemen 2003 
21.  India Myanmar 2004 
22.  Lithuania  Belarus 2004 
23.  Brunei  Malaysia 2005 
24.  Arab Emirates  Oman 2005 
25.  Arab Emirates  Saudi Arabia 2005 
26.  Kazakhstan  Uzbekistan 2006 
27.  Saudi Arabia  Iraq 2006 
28.  China  North Korea 2006 
29.  Iran  Iraq 2007 
30.  Iran  Pakistan 2007 
31.  Jordan  Iraq 2008 
32.  Jordan  Syria 2008 
33.  Russia  Georgia 2008 
34.  Myanmar  Bangladesh 2009 
35.  Saudi Arabia  Qatar 2009 
36.  Saudi Arabia  Oman 2009 
37.  Israel  Egypt 2010 
38.  Kazakhstan  Kyrgyzstan 2010 
Source: Authors description based on Vernon and Zimmermann 2019:24-25, Carter and Poast 
2017:249-250 and Zenderowski and Jankowski 2018:107  
 
